The Evolution of NATO

One of the hottest topics of discussion among World Federalists is the evolution of NATO. After a resolution was passed by W.F.A.'s Policy & Resolutions Committee in October 1997 (see Autumn 1997 T.D.W.F.), a refined version approved by the W.F.A. Executive Committee, received only 45% of the votes at W.F.A.'s Annual Meeting in March 1998. Nevertheless, NATO is a fact today and the admission of three additional Central European countries has occurred. Therefore, since the resolution aimed at publicizing the idea of transforming NATO in the direction of World Federalist (and European Federalist) goals, we take the liberty of publishing a version revised in March 1999. Send any suggestions, comments, or questions to the W.F.A. of Northern California.

[A] The World Federalist Association addresses the enlargement and transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a complex and controversial matter, with sympathetic concern.

[B] Enlargement would be best conceived, not as the enlargement of a Cold War alliance that began in 1949, but as enlargement of a democratic Atlantic grouping that began in the late 1800s and that grew generation by generation to incorporate its main former enemies: first reconciling America to its main enemy Britain, later incorporating their one-time great enemies France and Spain, and after 1945 incorporating the former great enemy Germany. In this context it can be understood that the incorporation of Russia and Ukraine would be the fulfillment of the original purpose and historical tendency of the alliance, not its negation.

[C] Many states in central and eastern Europe feel that a security vacuum has existed since the end of the Cold War. The WFA feels that some of those fears are justified. The desire of these states to integrate more fully into the economic, cultural and political life of all of Europe through the European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a constructive reaction to those fears, and is shown by their active participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace, and especially by their contributions to the current NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzogovina. At the same time, we judge that the actual costs of upgrading the militaries of new members to make their forces interoperable with NATO will be greater than has usually been stated, at a time when their stabilization and security depends primarily on their economic reconstruction. It is possible that burden sharing is a responsibility here on the part of the old members, who will benefit from the military contributions of the new members.

[D] WFA is an advocate of increased development of regional and global security units composed of volunteers. The use of volunteers may also be particularly necessary for avoiding nationalist backlash in the case of units that are placed directly and permanently under international command.

[E] We recognize the tragic necessities that had led to the inherently tragic policies of extended nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction during the Cold War, and are pleased to see that the strategic situation has changed drastically for the better since then. Recalling with General Andrew Goodpaster that it was always America's and NATO's goal to escape from these tragic policies and to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, to reaffirm the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, and to adopt the proximate goal of reduction of the size and overcoming of the mutual independence of the existing nuclear arsenals. We recognize that it is a matter of uncertainty whether the world must ultimately retain a small global nuclear force, as a deterrent against rogue states building weapons of mass destruction to terrorize the world, or whether it might someday be able to phase out even such a residual force as controls of fissile materials become more adequate. In either case, as a step toward the goal, NATO needs to start the roll-back of nuclear proliferation by integrating the existing separate nuclear forces of its members and of Russia, under a tight multilateral control structure, with UN supervision through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations UNSCOM; and to take advantage of the enhanced security this would provide to reduce nuclear forces dramatically. By replacing the separate Russian and American forces and eliminating their mutual nuclear deterrence, the multilateral force would make it immediately safe to de-alert nuclear weapons and reduce them to a fraction of their present number.

[F] The founding intentions of NATO deserve at this time to be brought back to the fore of the institutional memory, after becoming nearly forgotten in the long decades of the Cold War. These original intentions, as expressed in the Vandenberg Resolution and in the North Atlantic Treaty itself (and as confirmed and explained in the statements of those such as Theodore Achilles of the U.S. Department of State and Lester Pearson of Canada who did the most to write the treaty), were:
  *that NATO was meant to fill in with efficiency the space of regional security as long as the effective functioning of the UN in security matters was hobbled by the existence of the unit-veto in the Security Council;
  *that NATO and its members support the UN and its reform to escape the unit-veto;
  *that NATO meanwhile does not allow any right of veto within its own functioning but retains the flexibility in the North Atlantic Council to make decisions as needed to provide security and to conduct skillful diplomacy in rapidly changing conditions;
  *that NATO aims at fostering cooperation in all fields, economic and political as well as security; and
  *that NATO aims to contribute to the growth of a Euro-Atlantic community that should be and to some extent already is moving beyond nationalism to federalism.

[G] The World Federalist Association supports a vision for European, Atlantic-Eurasian, and global security, where security concerns are managed through a democratic federation under the rule of law. It appreciates the contribution meanwhile of the European (EU, its Western European Union arm --WEU, etc.), Atlantic-Eurasian (NATO, North Atlantic Assembly --NAA, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council --EAPC, Partnership for Peace Program --PfP, OSCE, G-7, etc.) and global (UN, IAEA, United Nations Special Commission --UNSCOM, ECOSOC, ILO, IBRD, IMF, WTO, etc.) systems of institutions, not as the final objectives but as steps towards our long-range vision of common security.

[H] The evolution of NATO can encompass steps toward this long-range vision of common security, but will fail to achieve that vision unless prior commitments to the following provisions are explicitly made:1. The enlargement shall be conceived as open to the entire OSCE space, as a continuation of a growth of democracy and integration of former enemies that has been proceeding ever since the late 1800s, and with the vital security interests of Russia, Ukraine, and the other states of central and eastern Europe taken fully into account throughout the process through serious consultations;2. The EAPC shall continue to develop its humanitarian and crisis management capabilities through the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), and NATO and EAPC deepen their cooperation with the EU, the OSCE and the United Nations, developing procedures for enhacement of mutual coordination and mutual effectiveness, and developing personal and organizational bonds for overcoming the divergent institutional cultures and institutional jealousies of the Cold War decades;3. NATO, recalling the goals of its founders of a true Atlantic Community, shall be democratized, with the North Atlantic Council sharing authority with the North Atlantic Assembly, and with increased flexibility on the political and diplomatic side as well as the military command side, by use of voting to adapt collective decisions to changing conditions;4. Russia and Ukraine shall be brought in step by step to membership, with such special arrangements as needed to do this without undermining NATO's effectiveness;5. The alliance shall gradually develop into a Europe-wide security force, closely coordinating with the EU and OSCE, and eventually merging NATO with OSCE on terms which marry the capabilities not the weaknesses of these two institutions;6. NATO shall undertake its force planning to eliminate redundancies in members' military forces and, as long as new large-scale threats do not appear, to achieve progressive reductions of their combined military budgets;7. NATO shall adopt a posture of no first use of nuclear weapons, reaffirm the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, and adopt the proximate goal of overcoming the mutual independence of nuclear arsenals and reducing their size; 8. NATO shall start the roll-back of nuclear proliferation by integrating the existing separate nuclear forces of its members and of Russia, forming a tight multilateral control structure for joint forces, with UN supervision through IAEA and UNSCOM; and, taking advantage of the qualitative new level of security this would provide, de-alert the weapons and reduce them to a fraction of the present number;9. NATO and WEU shall progressively incorporate all-volunteer integrated units, with an ultimate goal of becoming entirely composed of such units. Such an integrated volunteer force could stand as a model for an all-volunteer United Nations Security Force.